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I. INTRODUCTION

During the winter of 2015, more than 80,000 people in Western Ukraine lost
power.' That, in itself, would not be newsworthy but for the fact that the outage
was not due to a storm or fuel shortage, but "the first known cyber attack to take
down an electric grid." 2 Although efforts to attribute the attack remain
underway as of this writing,3 the episode highlights the difficulty of establishing
rules of the road for appropriate behavior in cyberspace, and what obligations
nations owe to one another-and to the private sector to help mitigate cyber
risk. Unfortunately, though much work has been done on applying the law of

*Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University; Senior Fellow,
Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research; Research Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs.
**Post-Graduate Fellow, Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, Indiana University.
1
See Jim Finkle, U.S. Power Companies Told to Review Defenses After Ukraine Cyber
Attack,

REUTERS

(Jan.

6,

2016,

5:57

PM),

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-utilities-

cybersecurity-idUSKBNOUK2MM20160106.
2.
Id.
3.
See id.
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warfare to cyber attacks,4 much more remains to be done on defining a law of
cyber peace applicable below the armed attack threshold. Among the most
pressing tasks in clarifying the applicable legal regimes "below the threshold" is
determining what exactly nations' due diligence obligations are to the public and
6
private sectors, as well as how these obligations should be translated into policy.
In this Article, we analyze how both the United States and the European Union
are operationalizing cybersecurity due diligence, and then move on to investigate
a menu of options presented to Members of the European Parliament in
November 2015 by the authors to further refine and apply this concept.
"Cybersecurity due diligence," a term unpacked further in Part I, may be
understood as the customary obligations of both State and non-State actors to
help identify and instill cybersecurity and governance best practices so as to
promote cyber peace, such as by enhancing the security of critical infrastructure.8
As such, the field of cybersecurity due diligence must be understood as part of
larger and ongoing conversations about Internet governance, and the search for a
steady state of cybersecurity, an end game acceptable to various stakeholders.
Although there are various concepts available for such a discussion, the focus in
this Article is on how the burgeoning field of cybersecurity due diligence plays

4.
See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE
17 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013).
5.
SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE 306 (2014); Henning Wegener, A

&

Concept of Cyber Peace, in THE QUEST FOR CYBER PEACE 77, 77, 82 (Int'l Telecomm. Union
World Fed'n of Scientists eds., 2011), http://www.itu.int/dmspub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GEN-WFS.01-12011-PDF-E.pdf.
6.
See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, "Below the Threshold" Cyber Operations: The
CountermeasuresResponse Option and InternationalLaw, 54 VA. J. INT'L L. 697, 726, 732 (2014)
("States would be well-advised to carefully consider the prospects for using countermeasures to
respond to 'below the threshold' cyber operations and to begin developing procedures and rules of
engagement for their employment.").
7.
This presentation took place at a cybersecurity briefing organized by the German Institute
for International and Security Affairs in Brussels, Belgium, in November 2015. The Article
represents a follow-up study to Unpacking the InternationalLaw on CybersecurityDue Diligence:
Lessons from the Public and Private Sectors in which we explored the international law on
cybersecurity due diligence by focusing here on how these conceptions are being translated by
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic. See Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Andreas
Kuehn, Unpacking the InternationalLaw on Cybersecurity Due Diligence, 17 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1,
1(2016).
8.
What is Critical Infrastructure, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/whatcritical-infrastructure (last updated Jan. 8, 2016). See also Frequently Asked Questions, INDUS.
CONTROL SYS. CYBER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Frequently-AskedQuestions (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) (The U.S. Cyber Emergency Response Team, which is part of
DHS, identifies sixteen critical infrastructure sectors consistent with Presidential Policy Directive
21, including: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams,
defense industrial base, emergency services, energy, financial service, food and agriculture,
government facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology, nuclear reactors,
materials, and waste, transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems).
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into conceptions of "cyber peace." For those unfamiliar with the term, the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a UN agency specializing in
information and communication technologies, pioneered some of the early work
in the field by defining "cyber peace" in part as "a universal order of
cyberspace" built on a "wholesome state of tranquility, the absence of disorder
or disturbance and violence .

. . .9"

Although certainly desirable, such an

outcome is politically and technically unlikely, at least in the near term.1 0 Cyber
peace is defined here not as the absence of conflict, what may be called negative
cyber peace." Rather, it is the construction of a network of multilevel regimes
that promote global, just, and sustainable cybersecurity by clarifying the rules of
the road for companies and countries alike-namely in the field of due
diligence-to help reduce the threats of cyber conflict, crime, and espionage to
levels comparable to other business and national security risks.12 In other words,
we are arguing for a positive vision of cyber peace that does three things: (1)
respects human rights, (2) spreads Internet access along with cybersecurity best
practices, and (3) strengthens governance mechanisms by fostering effective
multi-stakeholder collaboration.
To achieve this goal, cybersecurity best practices from both the public and
private sectors should be identified and cross pollinated to build robust, secure
systems, along with couching the many facets of international cybersecurity law
within the larger debate on Internet governance. There are various analytical
tools available to conceptualize such an approach, but the one used here is
polycentric governance. This multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-functional, and
multi-sectoral model,1 3 championed by scholars including Nobel Laureate Elinor
Ostrom and Professor Vincent Ostrom, challenges orthodoxy by demonstrating

9.
Wegener, supra note 5, at 78, 82 (arguing that "unprovoked offensive cyber action,
indeed any cyber attack, is incompatible with the tenets of cyber peace.").
10. To its credit, though, the ITU report recognizes this fact, and that the concept of cyber
peace should be broad and malleable given an ever-changing political climate and cyber threat
landscape. Id. at 78 ("The definition [of cyber peace] cannot be watertight, but must be rather
intuitive, and incremental in its list of ingredients.").
11. The notion of negative peace has been applied in diverse contexts, including civil rights.
See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Nonviolence and Racial Justice, in THE PAPERS OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 118, 119 (Claybome Carson ed., 2000) (arguing "[t]rue peace is not merely the
absence of some negative force-tension, confusion or war; it is the presence of some positive
force justice, good will and brotherhood.").
12. See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action
Problems 1 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis, Working Paper Series No.
08-6, 2008), http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4417/WO8-6_OstromDLC.pdf
?sequence=1.
13. Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom
Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39 POL'Y STUD. J. 169, 171 (2011) (defining
polycentricity as "a system of governance in which authorities from overlapping jurisdictions (or
centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions under which these authorities, as well as
the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well as the constraints put
upon their activities for public purposes.").
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the benefits of self-organization, networking regulations "at multiple scales,"14
and examining the extent to which national and private control can in some cases
coexist with communal management. It also posits that, due to the existence of
free riders in a multipolar world, "a single governmental unit" is often incapable
of managing "global collective action problems" 5 such as cyber attacks.
Instead, a polycentric approach recognizes that diverse organizations working at
multiple levels can create different types of policies that can increase levels of
cooperation and compliance, enhancing "flexibility across issues and
adaptability over time."' 6 This approach has the promise of moving us beyond
common classifications of cybersecurity challenges, recognizing that cyberspace
is uniquely dynamic and malleable, and that its "stratified . . . structure
[underscores] . . . a particularly complex regulatory environment, meaning that

mapping or forecasting" the effects of regulations is problematic.' 7 This, as we
will see, has important implications in the cybersecurity due diligence context,
and is an idea that is enjoying increased traction with the likes of the President of
Estonia, Hendrik Ilves, and the President of the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Fadi Chehad6, relying on the term to
describe the Internet governance ecosystem.1 Ultimately we argue that a menu
of policy options are available that would enhance cybersecurity due diligence in
both the U.S. and EU, but that certain market-orientated options likely will
experience the greatest political support, and as such, could be an appropriate
foundation on which to build.
This Article is structured as follows. Part II introduces the concept of
cybersecurity due diligence, leveraging both the international law and
transactional literatures.19 Parts III and IV then examine how it is being
operationalized both within the United States and the European Union
20
respectively.
Part V explores the utility of a menu of policy options ranging
from publicly funded bug bounty programs and subsidized cyber risk insurance

14. Ostrom, supra note 12, at 1.
15. Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 35 (The World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/pe/2009
/04268.pdf.
16. Robert 0. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change 9
PERSP. ON POL. 7, 15 (2011); cf Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and
Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 157 (2008)
(discussing the legitimacy of polycentric regimes, and arguing that "[a]ll regulatory regimes are
polycentric to varying degrees").
17. ANDREW W. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE
ENVIRONMENT

52-53 (2006).

18. See, e.g., Nancy Scola, ICANN Chief "The Whole World is Watching" the U.S.'s Net
Neutrality Debate, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/10/07/internet-operations-chief-snowden-disclosures-make-my-job-easier/
(discussing an interview with Fadi Chehad6).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 22-39.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 40-97.
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schemes to an EU-wide cyber hygiene campaign that are designed to further the
cause of cybersecurity due diligence as part of an overarching campaign to foster
21
cyber peace.
II.

INTRODUCING "CYBERSECURITY DUE DILIGENCE"

What is cybersecurity due diligence? International law is not dispositive in
this instance in that it does not spell out in detail how nations should go about
enhancing their cybersecurity posture to account for emerging due diligence
obligations. For example, in Corfu Channel, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) held that it is "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory
to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States." 22 In the cybersecurity
context, this decision could be extended to hold "that States have a duty to warn
other States of known or foreseeable harms, particularly when those harms arise
from within the warning State's sovereign territory."23 However, though a given
cyber attack may be launched from within a State's territorial boundaries,
24
attributing it back to that State's government is no simple matter.
Similar translational problems arise in other ICJ cases, including Trail
Smelter and Nicaragua.25 This is true in the former instance given difficulties of
extending what has come to be known as the "no harm" principle, which requires
of States "that activities within their jurisdiction or control respect the
environment of other States,"26 to new arenas like cybersecurity.27 In the latter
case, making Trail Smelter's interpretation of due diligence align with other ICJ
precedent, like Nicaragua with regards to State sovereignty, is also
28
challenging.
In deciding Nicaragua, the ICJ found that unlawful State
intervention in the inner workings of other nations was unlawful if it pertained to
"the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the
formulation of foreign policy." 29 This depiction of State sovereignty stands in
juxtaposition to the Court's "no harm" decision in Trail Smelter, and in fact is
arguably more consistent with those nations like China arguing for "Internet
sovereignty" or "cyber sovereignty," the notion that "countries had the right to

21. See infra text accompanying notes 98-161.
22. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22 (April 9).
23. Shackelford, Russell, & Kuehn, supra note 7, at 8; see id.
24. Erik M. Mudrinich, Cyber 3.0: The Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in
Cyberspace andthe Attribution Problem, 68 A.F.L. REV. 167, 193-195 (2012).
25. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 201-209 (June 27); Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A.
1905, 1912 (1938).
26. Ralph Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW,
447, 457 (Erkki J. Hollo et al. eds., 2013).
27. For more on this topic, see Shackelford, Russell, & Kuehn, supra note 7.
28. See id.
29. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 205 (June 27).
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choose how to develop and regulate their internet." 30 The multilateral versus
multi-stakeholder debate over the future of cyberspace (centering around how
much power governments have a right to exercise online) will not be settled
anytime soon, but 2014 did bring two notable successes for the prevailing multistakeholder model in Brazil and South Korea. 3' The future of multi-stakeholder
Internet governance in the context of Westphalian conceptions of State
sovereignty embodied in Chinese President Xi's proclamation of "cyber
sovereignty" over the long run remains unclear, but the potential for domestic
cyber policies to have international ramifications has never been greater.32
Given the lack of clarity on the topic of cybersecurity due diligence in the
international law literature, it is informative to consider the transactional context,
in which this term has been defined as "the review of the governance, processes
and controls that are used to secure information assets." 33 Or more simply, some
have argued that "due diligence refers to your activities to identify and
understand the risks facing your organization." 34
"Such due diligence
obligations may exist between States, between non-state actors (e.g., private
corporations), and between State and non-state actors. "
However, under
international law the emphasis is on State responsibilities particularly to
safeguard vulnerable critical infrastructures from misuse, overuse, and attack.36
For example, the Obama Administration has defined cybersecurity due diligence
as the requirement that States, "should recognize and act on their responsibility
to protect information infrastructures and secure national systems from damage

&

30. China Internet: Xi Jinping Calls for 'Cyber Sovereignty,' BBC (Dec. 16, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35109453 [hereinafter China Internet].
3 1. For more on this and other developments in the field of Internet governance, see Scott J.
Shackelford et al., Back to the Future of Internet Governance?, GEO. J. INT'L AFF.
http://journal.georgetown.edu/back-to-the-future-of-internet-governance/.
This debate has also
played out in the context of "Internet freedom" versus "Internet sovereignty." See, e.g., Scott J.
Shackelford, The Coming Age of Internet Sovereignty?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-j-shackelford/internet-sovereignty b 2420719.html
(discussing countries' differing perspectives on internet regulation).
32. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199
(9th Cir. 2006) (noting that a decision granting broad First Amendment Protection for internet
speech might violate the laws or offend the sensibilities of other countries); JACK GOLDSMITH
TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 5 (2006).

33. Tim Ryan & Leonard Navarro, Cyber Due Diligence: Pre-TransactionAssessments Can
Uncover Costly Risks, KROLL (Jan. 28, 2015), http://blog.kroll.com/2015/cyber-due-diligence-pretransaction-assessments-can-uncover-costly-risks/.
34.

GREGORY J. TOUHILL & C. JOSEPH TOUHILL, CYBERSECURITY FOR EXECUTIVES: A

PRACTICAL GUIDE 209 (2014).
35. Scott J. Shackelford, Understanding Cybersecurity Due Diligence, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept.
16,
2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-j-shackelford/understandingcybersecuri b_8140648.html.
36. See International Oceans, Environment, Health, and Aviation Law: White House and
Department of Defense Announce Strategies to Promote Cybersecurity, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 794,
795 (2011).
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or misuse."37 The term is used here, as was stated in the Introduction, consistent
with this latter interpretation, though the difficulty comes in operationalizing
such necessarily vague obligations. That is why it is vital to review State
practice, especially given regulatory movement in the U.S. with regards to cyber
threat information sharing,38 as well as in the EU with the recently agreed upon
Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive and the General Data Privacy
Directive, which is still pending as of this writing.39
III. OPERATIONALIZING

CYBERSECURITY

DUE

DILIGENCE IN

THE UNITED

STATES

As Part II demonstrated, international law, while informative, does not spell
out how nations (or companies under their jurisdiction) should go about
enhancing their cybersecurity to account for emerging due diligence obligations.
There is currently no consensus from the ICJ or elsewhere, for example, on when
neutral transit countries must police their networks such as by detecting or
blocking cyber attacks. 40 As such, it is important to consider how leading cyber
powers-such as the U.S. and the EU-consider the topic.
The Obama Administration has been a champion of cybersecurity due
diligence, having first publicly referenced the topic in its 2011 International
Strategy for Cyberspace. 41 In this document, the Administration makes the case
that it is vital to crystallize a cybersecurity due diligence norm in international
law, which they argue is "essential" as part of broader norm-building efforts to
enhance international critical infrastructure cybersecurity.42 This notion of
cybersecurity norm-building is popular across myriad sectors as diverse as
NATO and Microsoft. 43

The argument goes that, due to the practical and

political difficulties surrounding multilateral treaty development in the
cybersecurity arena, norms can help move the ball forward (though whether or

37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Paul Rosenzweig, The CybersecurityAct of 2015, LAWFARE (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/cybersecurity-act-2015 (discussing the Cybersecurity Act of 2015).
39. See, e.g., The Network and Information Security Directive - Who is In and
Who
is
Out?,
REGISTER
(Jan.
7,
2016),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2016/01/07/thenetworkandinformationsecuritydirective who is in and who is out/
(discussing recently agreed upon draft of Network and Information Security Directive).
40 An earlier version of this research was published as Scott J. Shackelford, Understanding
Cybersecurity
Due
Diligence,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sept.
16,
2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-j-shackelford/understanding-cybersecuri b_8140648.html.
41. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS
IN A NETWORKED WORLD, WHITE HOUSE 10 (2011).
42. Id.
43.

See MICROSOFT, INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY NORMS: REDUCING CONFLICT IN AN

INTERNET-DEPENDENT WORLD 2 (2014); Eneken Tikk, Ten Rules of Behaviorfor Cyber Security,
SURVIVAL, June 2011, at 119.
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not such reasoning stands in a post-Paris Accord world is an open question).44
Yet despite near consensus as to the value of cybersecurity norms including due
diligence, "even simple norms face serious opposition. Conflicting political
agendas, covert military actions, espionage[,] and competition for global
influence" have created a difficult context for cyber norm development and
diffusion.45 As a result, to be successful in such a difficult climate, norms must
46
be clear, useful, and attainable.
The question then becomes how to make
cybersecurity due diligence clear and attainable. The U.S. has had some success
in applying international law to cybersecurity 47 but translating due diligence

obligations is no simple feat. It is helpful to briefly review U.S. approaches to
this topic in order to build a framework for discussion.
The United States has strategized about national cybersecurity arguably
since the creation of the world's first Cyber Emergency Response Team at
Carnegie Mellon University in 1988, which was in response to the Morris
Worm arguably the world's first documented cyber attack. 48 Today, though,
the field is crowded with an alphabet soup of agencies and organizations
responsible for various aspects of national cybersecurity. The U.S. Department
of Defense alone reportedly operates more than 15,000 networks in 4,000
installations spread across some 88 nations.49 Yet the majority of U.S. efforts in

44. For more on applying lessons from the climate change movement to enhancing
cybersecurity, see Scott J. Shackelford, On Climate Change and Cyber Attacks: Leveraging
Polycentric Governance to Mitigate Global Collective Action Problems, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
(forthcoming 2016); Scott J. Shackelford & Timothy L. Fort, Sustainable Cybersecurity: Applying
Lessons from the Green Movement to Managing Cyber Attacks, UNIV. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016).
45. James A. Lewis, Confidence-Building and InternationalAgreement in Cybersecurity, 4
DISARMAMENT FORUM: 51, 58 (2011).
46. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 895-98 (1998).
47. See Elaine Korzak, InternationalLaw and the UN GGE Report on Information Security,
JUST SEC. (Dec. 2, 2015, 9:15 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/28062/international-law-ggereport-information-security/; Henry Farrell, Promoting Norms for Cyberspace, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(April
2015),
http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/promoting-normscyberspace/p36358?cid=nlc-npbnews-2015_national conference confirmation and background-link22-20150602&spmid=48790069&sp rid=a3plZ3VyYUBjZnlub3JnSO (arguing that the U.S.
government should take the following three steps to reinvigorate a norms-based approach to
multilateral cybersecurity policymaking: "reform U.S. intelligence activities to make them more
consistent with the publicly expressed norms of Internet openness that the United States is trying to
establish; disclose more convincing evidence when trying to shame actors that do not abide by
cybersecurity norms; and encourage other states and civil society actors to take a leading role in
norm promotion-even when this cuts against U.S. interests.").
48. See Scott J. Shackelford, Another 'Back to the Future'Moment - 27 Years After the
World's First Cyber Attack, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2015,
11:59 A.M),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-j-shackelford/another-back-to-the-futuremoment b 8428352.html
49. KRISTIN M. LORD & TRAVIS SHARP, AMERICA'S CYBER FUTURE: SECURITY AND
PROSPERITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 12 (2011).
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this space have been focused on securing vulnerable critical infrastructure (CI). 50
Although Congress has been active in this regard with a slew of sector-specific
CI legislation,5 ' successive administrations-including those of Presidents
Clinton, Bush, and Obama have also focused on securing vulnerable CI, a topic
that was brought into sharp relief given revelations regarding the late 2015 cyber
52
attacks on Ukrainian CI causing mass blackouts mentioned in the Introduction.
President Obama unequivocally stated that U.S. CI was a "strategic national
asset" in 2009, though a fully integrated U.S. cybersecurity policy for protecting
it has yet to be developed.53 The process took a step forward, though, when after
eight years of debate, Congress passed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.54 This
Act does not reference "due diligence" per se, but it does impact the concept, in
particular by offering a liability shield in exchange for private-public cyber threat
information sharing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security "conducted
in accordance with the bill's provisions," and by requiring the reporting of
cyber attacks on CI.56 President Obama has also issued an executive order that,
among other things, expanded public-private information sharing and established
the NIST Framework comprised partly of private-sector best practices that
companies could adopt to better secure CI.5 7 This Framework is important since,

50. Id. at 9.
51. See John A. Fisher, Note, Secure My Data or Pay the Price: Consumer Remedy for the
Negligent Enablement ofData Breach, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 215, 224-25 (2013).
52. See Alex Hem, UkrainianBlackout Caused by Hackers that Attacked Media Company,
Researchers Say,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
7,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/jan/07/ukrainian-blackout-hackers-attacked-media-company;
see Finkle, supra
note 1 and accompanying text.
53. Remarks by the President on Securing our Nation's Cyber Infrastructure, THE WHITE
HOUSE, (May 29, 2009, 11:08 A.M.), http://www.Whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-securing-our-nations-cyber-infrastructure; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13462T, CYBERSECURITY: A BETTER DEFINED AND IMPLEMENTED NATIONAL STRATEGY Is NEEDED
To ADDRESS PERSISTENT CHALLENGES (2013) ("Further, without an integrated strategy that

includes key characteristics, the federal government will be hindered in making further progress in
addressing cybersecurity challenges.").
54. See Rosenzweig, supra note 38; Alina Selyukh, Cybersecurity LegislationFinds a Place
in
U.S.
Budget
Bill,
NPR
(Dec.
16,
2015,
3:21
P.M.),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/12/16/459999069/cybersecurity-legislationfinds-a-place-in-u-s-budget-bill ("After years of debate, cybersecurity legislation may pass this
week, tucked inside the trillion-dollar federal spending bill.... The focus of this legislation, called
'The Cybersecurity Act of 2015,' is to encourage companies to share with the government and each
other technical details of hacking threats (for example, IP addresses or malicious code), as close to
in real time as possible.").
55. Rosenzweig, supra note 38.
56. Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 208 (Dec. 18, 2015).
57. See generally, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY CYBERSECURITY
FRAMEWORK 1 (2013), http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/preliminary-cybersecurity-framework.pdf
(For example, the Framework seeks to "encourage organizations to consider cybersecurity risk as a

Published by Scholar Commons, 2016

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 7
618

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 67: 609

even though its critics argue that it helps to solidify a reactive stance to the
nation's cybersecurity challenges, it is arguably spurring the development of a
standard of cybersecurity care in the United States that plays into discussions of
due diligence.59 In particular, the NIST Framework harmonizes industry best
practices to provide, its proponents argue, a flexible and cost-effective approach
to managing cyber risk.60
Although the NIST Framework has only been out since 2014, already some
private-sector clients are receiving the advice that if their "cybersecurity
practices were ever questioned during litigation or a regulatory investigation, the
'standard' for 'due diligence' was now the NIST Cybersecurity Framework." 61
Over time, the NIST Framework not only has the potential to shape a standard of
care for domestic critical infrastructure organizations, but also could help to
harmonize global cybersecurity best practices for the private sector writ large
given active NIST collaborations with a number of nations including the United
62
Kingdom, Japan, Korea, Estonia, Israel, and Germany, among other nations.
IV. OPERATIONALIZING CYBERSECURITY DUE DILIGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION

The European Union's approach to operationalizing cybersecurity due
diligence is, as with many aspects of the European Union, complicated. Viewed
broadly, the EU strategy is two-fold: ensure the protection of EU citizen's
personal data, and promote the development of cybersecurity standards for EU

priority similar to financial, safety, and operational risk while factoring in larger systemic risks
inherent to critical infrastructure.").
58. See Taylor Armerding, NIST's Finalized Cybersecurity Framework Receives Mixed
Reviews, CSO (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134338/security-leadership/nists-finalized-cybersecurity-framework-receives-mixed-reviews.html (noting different criticisms from
several experts in the area of cyber security; their general consensus is that the NIST Framework
will not provide enough protection against cyber-crimes, especially against the "most capable"
attacker).
59. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Care?: Exploring
the Implications of the 2014 NIST CybersecurityFramework on Shaping Reasonable National and
InternationalCybersecurityPractices, 50 TEX. J. INT L.J. 305 (2015).
60. Executive Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. at 33,11,741 (Feb. 19, 2013).
61. John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn't Really Voluntary, PIVOT
POlNT SEC. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/risky-business/nist-cybersecurityframework.
62. There is some evidence that this may already be happening, including with regards to the
Federal Trade Commission's cybersecurity enforcement powers. See, e.g., Brian Fung, A CourtJust
Made it Easierfor the Government to Sue Companiesfor Getting Hacked, WASH. POST, (Aug. 24,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/08/24/a-court-just-made-iteasier-for-the-govemment-to-sue-companies-for-getting-hacked/?wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl-headlines
(noting, for example, the recent Third Circuit decision allowing the FTC to pursue charges against
Wyndham for inadequately protecting its customers from recent cyber-attacks).
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Yet despite employing broad-spectrum data protection laws

since the 1990s,64 and developing cybersecurity standards for CI since the early

2000s,65 the EU's multipolar governance structure coupled with the difficulty in
regulating cyberspace has historically limited significant progress on
66
cybersecurity policymaking.
This state of affairs is exacerbated by ongoing
negotiations regarding the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the
new Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive, both of which will bring
significant changes to the legal environment of both European privacy and
67
cybersecurity standards.
Yet despite continuing uncertainty, discussing these
developments in the context of the evolution of EU cybersecurity policymaking
helps derive a better understanding of comparative approaches to due diligence.
Before delving into the specifics of the EU approach to cybersecurity
policymaking, it is important to highlight a recurring conflict in EU governance:
the inherent power struggle between individual Member States and EU-wide
institutions.68 The EU's composition as a collection of sovereign States makes
internal governance complicated,69 as the desire for Member State autonomy is
at odds with EU-wide policy goals, which often require greater uniformity and
accountability. 70 These competing principles are realized through "directives"

63. For example, the European Union regulations pertaining to cyber-security began in 1995
with the Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, infra note 64, and continued into the 2000s
with the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, infra note 65, with the most
recent regulation in 2015, with the establishment of the General Data Protection Regulation, infra
note 74.
64. Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
65. Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical
Infrastructure Protection, COM (2006) 0786 final (Dec. 12, 2006), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0786&from=EN [hereinafter 2006 EPCIP COM].
66. See Ralf Bosen, Power Struggles Delay EU Data ProtectionReform, DEUTSCHE WELLE,
(May
13,
2014),
http://www.dw.com/en/power-struggles-delay-eu-data-protection-reform/a17631222 (noting how the European Union's legal progress is traditionally slow due to conflicting
interests between member-states).
67. Sebastian F.A. Vos et. al., EU Policy Updatesfor January 2016, NAT'L L. REV. (Jan. 6,
2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/eu-policy-update-january-2016.
68. See Bosen, supra note 66 (illustrating, for example, how Germany, an EU member-state,
is reluctant to impose newer privacy legislation).
69. This may be seen in the EU requirement that EU Member States ratify hybrid
international treaties along with the EU as an independent entity. See Procedurefor the Adoption of
International Agreements,
EUR-LEX,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=
URISERV%3All4532 (last visited Jan. 12, 2016) (detailing the procedure for ratification of
international agreements).
70. See Bosen, supra note 66 (noting that "individual EU states must still give the
amendment a green light before it becomes law.").
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and "regulations," the two primary mechanisms for EU-wide legislation.'
Directives require Member State implementation and therefore preserve greater
72
autonomy than regulations, which are immediately enforceable across the EU.
This distinction may be particularly important in the cyber context, as the
73
difficulty in regulating cyberspace has tended to centralize regulatory power, as
can be seen in the development of EU data protection law.
The foundations for EU cybersecurity due diligence are seen in the EU's
historic approach to data protection, culminating in the recently introduced
GDPR.74
The EU approach to data protection largely began with the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines,
which articulated eight privacy principles governing national data protection
policies among the adhering OECD nations.7 5 Although non-binding, these
principles created a groundwork for data protection that has percolated through
76
each subsequent iteration of EU data protection law.
The Data Protection
Directive furthered the OECD guidelines by requiring each Member State to
enact domestic legislation comporting with the privacy principles, which would
be enforced by a national data protection authority and guaranteed through
restrictions on the transfer of personal data to countries without "adequate"
privacy protections.
Yet while the directive unified the EU approach to data
protection, national variations in implementation coupled with the drastic
expansion and development of the global Internet made the directive
increasingly inadequate as a framework for data protection, culminating in the

71. See Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/eu-law/decisionmaking/legal-acts/index en.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
72. Id.
73. The same process has played out in the EU sustainability context. See Elisa Morgera,
Introduction to European Environmental Law from an International Environmental Law
Perspective 1-10 (Univ. of Edinburgh Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2010/37, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711372 (noting that climate change is an area in which the EU is
"expected to play a significant role" at the international level).
74. Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General DataProtection Regulation), COM (2015) No. 15039 (Dec. 15,
2015) [hereinafter GeneralData ProtectionRegulation].
75. Recommendations of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of
Privacy and TransborderFlows ofPersonalData,C(80)58/final (Sept. 23, 1980).
76. See OECD, THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE PRIVACY GUIDELINES OECD 53 (2011),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/49710223.pdf (illustrating the effects the privacy guidelines have
had on subsequent EU law-making, such as the creation of the EU-US Safe Harbor Framework and
the Binding Corporate Rules, which mandate adequate legal protection for data).
77. Data Protection Directive, supra note 64, at 45-46.
78. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, Seeking a Safe Harbor in a Widening Sea: Unpacking the
EJC'sSchrems Decision and What it Means for Transatlantic Relations, SETON HALL DIPL. & INT.
REL. (forthcoming 2016).
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development of the GDPR to update and unify data protection law for the entire
EU. 79

The GDPR, recently finalized, represents the most recent iteration of EU
data protection law.o
While there are numerous minor differences in
implementation, the GDPR differs more substantially in a few notable ways from
prior reform efforts. The largest distinguishing factor of the GDPR is that it
centralizes data protection authority in the EU into a single regulatory body, as
compared with the EU Data Privacy Directive's (DPD) utilization of national
data protection authorities for each Member State. 8' This development is
designed to unify the EU regulatory landscape while providing more parity in
Member State representation, as the DPD tended to permit businesses to forum
shop, seeking those Member States (such as, historically, Ireland) with the most
business-friendly data protection authority.82 Also notable is the apparent shift
towards a risk-management model for implementing the privacy principles, as
compared with the more direct regulatory approach seen previously. 83 While
this may have been influenced by US policy, which has historically favored a
risk-based approach to privacy and security, it may also be a logical progression
from the difficulty of strict compliance. 84 Finally, the GDPR extends the
jurisdictional reach of EU data protection requirements to data processing that
occurs outside the territorial boundaries of the EU when the processor targets
individuals within the EU for the offering of goods or services, or when the
processor is monitoring EU persons that are located within the territorial bounds
85
of the EU.
This broadening of the EU's interpretation of data jurisdiction,
while of questionable regulatory value without international cooperation or
corresponding territorial sovereignty, may be seen as a proclamation of EU due

79. European Commission, Reform of EU Data Protection Rules, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
80. GeneralDataProtectionRegulation, supra note 74.
81. Id. at 182.
82. Phil Lee, Will the New EU General Data Protection Regulation Prevent Forum
Shopping?, FIELDFISHER (May 12, 2015), http://privacylawblog.fieldfisher.com/2015/will-the-neweu-general-data-protection-regulation-prevent-forum-shopping.
83. Council
of
the
European
Union
Proposes
Risk-Based
Approach
to
Compliance
Obligations,
HUNTON
&
WILLIAMS
(Oct.
29,
2014),
http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2014/10/29/
council-european-union-proposes-risk-based-approach-compliance-obligations/.
84. See KATHERINE O'KEEFE & DARAGH O'BRIEN, SUBJECT ACCESS REQUESTS: A DATA
HEALTH CHECK 12 (Castlebridge Assocs. ed., 2015), https://castlebridge.ie/products/whitepapers/
2015/09/subject-access-requests-data-health-check ("40% of Data Controllers are failing to ensure
adequate technological or organisational [sic] controls to prevent unauthorised [sic] access to or
disclosure of personal data. . . ").
85. GeneralDataProtectionRegulation, supra note 74, at 82.
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diligence expectations for foreign nations whose internal activities implicate EU
86
interests online: specifically, the protection of personal data of EU citizens.
With regard to direct cybersecurity regulations, the EU approach has
historically resembled that of the U.S. by focusing on protecting CI, with the
87
European Council first requesting a CI cybersecurity strategy in 2004, which
led to the development of the European Network and Information Security
Agency (ENISA), and was followed by the European Programme for Critical
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) in 2006.89 Yet the most substantial step
towards a broad-spectrum cybersecurity policy came in 2013 with the
Cybersecurity Strategy for the European Union. 90 The 2013 Strategy, while
informative for elucidating broad policy goals, is most important for its initiation
of the NIS Directive process, which would establish binding cybersecurity
requirements for each Member State, and is therefore probably the best example
of the EU approach to operationalizing due diligence to date.
The 2013 NIS Directive identifies broad cybersecurity requirements that
serve as the foundation for cybersecurity policy in each respective EU Member
State. 91 The first requirement is to create a standard of cybersecurity for all
businesses based upon risk management, with exceptions only for the smallest
businesses.92 This is coupled with a requirement for each EU Member State to
enact legislation establishing a national cybersecurity strategy, a national
cybersecurity authority, and a national Cyber Emergency Response Team
(CERT), if such entities do not exist already. 93 These national authorities are
also obliged to participate in a "cooperation network" that includes, among other
requirements, information sharing and breach reporting between Member States,

86. Omer Tene & Christopher Wolf, Overextended: Jurisdictionand Applicable Law Under
the EU General Data Protection Regulation, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM 2-4 (2013),
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-Future-of-Privacy-Forum-White-Paper-on-Jurisdictionand-Applicable-Law-January-20134.pdf.
87. 2006 EPCIP COM, supra note 65.
88. Regulation 460/2004, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004
establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency, 2004 O.J. (L 077) 1, 2,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004RO460:EN:HTML.
89. 2006 EPCIP COM, supra note 65.
90. See JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS:
CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN OPEN, SAFE AND SECURE
CYBERSPACE, EUROPEAN COMM. (Feb. 7, 2013), http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-cyber-

security/cybseccomm en.pdf.
91. Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliamentand of the Council Concerning
Measures to Ensure a High Common Level of Network and Information Security Across the Union,
EUROPEAN
COMM
(2013)
(July
2,
2013),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013PC0048.
92. Id. at 9 ("[T]he requirements are proportionate to the risk presented . . and should not
apply to micro enterprises.").
93. Id. at arts. 19-21.
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as well as participation in coordinated responses to cyber threats.94 The extent of
these obligations, however, is still unclear, as States may see cyber threats as
falling in the realm of national security, and therefore outside the scope of this
strata of EU governance.95 Finally, in furtherance of the emphasis on risk
management, the 2013 Strategy led to the development of the NIS Platform,
which establishes a framework for evaluating cybersecurity due diligence, and
which largely incorporates the NIST Framework core elements-identify,
protect, detect, respond, recover-as the standard approach for enterprise risk
management.96
While these policies taken together outline a broad conception of the EU
approach to cybersecurity due diligence, several questions remain unanswered.
How the EU will balance its embrace of multi-stakeholder risk management with
its increasingly centralized regulatory approach to both data privacy and
cybersecurity remains to be seen, as do the practical ramifications of the EU's
increasingly broad pronouncements of data jurisdiction. Subsequent to the
approval of the EU Commission, the text of the NIS Directive now heads for
formal approval to the European Parliament and the European Council.97 After
that, individual EU Member States will have twenty-one months to implement
the deal. 98 Competing interests in cyberspace will certainly continue to muddy
due diligence obligations throughout and after this period of time, particularly
for organizations operating in multiple regions, and it is unclear whether national
practices alone will be sufficient to develop an unambiguous standard of
cybersecurity due diligence.
V.

OFFERING A MENU OF CYBERSECURITY DUE DILIGENCE OPTIONS FOR
POLICYMAKERS AND MANAGERS

No nation is an island in cyberspace, however as much as they may
sometimes wish to be. 99 To fulfill their international legal obligations, States
arguably needs to be able to exercise control over Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) and CI under their jurisdiction. Yet this is a
difficult and complex undertaking given the challenges of jurisdiction,

94. Id. at art. 21.
95. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 4, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J.
(C 83) 18 ("national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member state.").
96. NIS Platform (WG-1), Network and Information Security Risk Management
Organizational Structures
and
Requirements,
at
2-4,
Final
Draft
220515,
https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/nis-platform/shared-documents/5th-plenary-meeting/chapter-1-nisrisk-management-organisational-structures-and-requirements-v2/atdownload/file.
97. See European Commission Press Release IP/15/6270, Commission Welcomes Agreement
to Make EU Online Environment More Secure (Dec. 8, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease IP-15-6270_en.htm.
98. Id.
99. See ChinaInternet, supra note 30.
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attribution, ambiguous norms, and extensive private-sector ownership of CI,
among other challenges discussed above.' 00 This final Part seeks to apply and
build from lessons learned in Parts II and III to present a menu of policy options
for the EU (given its current status in enacting both the NIS Directive and
GDPD), and other nations including the U.S. (especially given DHS's ongoing
enactment of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015) wishing to enhance their
cybersecurity preparedness. This menu is not meant to be a comprehensive
rendering; it was first compiled in response to an invitation in November 2015
from the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the
European Union to prepare and present an academic input statement based on the
authors' research to a multi-stakeholder gathering of Members of the European
Parliament in Brussels, Belgium. Rather, the goal here is to think through
mechanisms by which domestic policy could enhance cybersecurity due
diligence such as through active private-sector partnerships. Specifically, to
further their cybersecurity due diligence mandates, policymakers can consider a
menu of options relevant to the NIS Directive, the GDPR, and the Cybersecurity
Act of 2015. Five main overarching topics are addressed in turn: (1) tailored
cybersecurity frameworks and certifications, (2) integrated reporting, (3)
international cyber threat information sharing, (4) proactive cybersecurity
policies including cyber risk insurance, and (5) cybersecurity capacity-building
measures.
A.

Policymakers could encourage the use of tailored frameworks,
certifications, and incentives such as prizes to help identify firms with
best-in-class cybersecurity, singling out those companies that use the
power of their supply chains to enhance the security of vendors and
businesspartners.

First, regarding prizes, policymakers could offer incentives-such as
through tax breaks' 0'-or perhaps even require private actors under their
jurisdiction to invest in cybersecurity best practices.102 One example of this
approach already being tried is under the Obama Administration, which will
reportedly offer prizes to firms that have implemented and advertised the NIST

100. See Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships, DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/criticalinfrastructure-sector-partnerships (last visited Jan. 31, 2016) (discussing the issues involved with
private sector ownership of CI).
101. See, e.g., House REPUBLICAN CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, 112TH CONG.,
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE 5, 8, 14 (Comm.

Print 2011) ("To encourage companies to increase their investment in network security, Congress
should consider expanding or extending existing tax credits, such as the R&D tax credit, to apply to
cyber investments as an alternative to creating new tax credits.").
102 For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell, & Jeffrey Haut, Bottoms
Up: A Comparison of "Voluntary" Cybersecurity Frameworks, - UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
DAVIS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

-

(forthcoming 2016).
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Framework.1 03 The European Parliament could undertake a similar voluntary
program to reward leading firms-or even Member States-that have done the
most to advance the goals of the NIS Directive and the GDPR. Regular
summaries or report cards as shown in Table 1 could be issued for EU Member
States with rewards available for market leaders and norm entrepreneurs.
Similarly, parliaments could either incentivize existing bug bounty programs
being run by private firms that provide rewards to hackers who report
vulnerabilities,1 04 or create public versions of such programs given that such
reporting is in the public good. o0
Second, regarding certifications, policymakers could encourage the private
sector to develop the digital equivalent of Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design (LEED standards), which would help identify firms with
best-in-class cybersecurity.
To those unfamiliar, LEED is a "voluntary,
consensus-based,
provides
third-party
market-driven
program ... that
verification of green buildings.' 0 6 It provides a flexible framework to rank
various projects along multiple dimensions. 0 7 The NIS Directive (like the NIST
Framework) could provide a foundation on which to build a LEED-type
cybersecurity certification scheme. The UK's Cyber Essentials and Cyber
Essentials Plus certificates could also be used as analogues, with the proviso
being that any such approach should be voluntary and tailored to help guard
against "checklist" cybersecurity.108
Third, policymakers could encourage firms to leverage the power of their
supply chains to spread cybersecurity best practices akin to what companies such
as IBM are doing with regards to promoting sustainability.1 09 More companies
are already requiring NIST Framework compliance in their supply chains and

103. See Kent Landfield & Malcolm Harkins, We Tried the NIST Framework and It Works,
McAFEE: EXECUTIVE PERSPECTIVES BLOG (Feb. 11, 2015), https://blogs.mcafee.com/executive-

perspectives/tried-nist-framework-works-2/.
104. See, e.g., The Bug Bounty List, BUG CROWD, https://bugcrowd.com/list-of-bug-bountyprograms (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) (listing different firms that have bug bounty programs and were
incentivized to provide rewards to hackers).
105. See Eduard Kovacs, Invitation-Only Bug Bounty Programs Becoming More Popular:
Bugcrowd, SEC. WK. (July 30, 2015), http://www.securityweek.com/invitation-only-bug-bountyprograms-becoming-more-popular-bugcrowd.
106. LEED, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://new.usgbc.org/leed (last visited Mar. 11,
2016); Resources for Sustainable Federal Buildings and Campuses, ENERGY.Gov,
http://energy.gov/eere/temp/resources-sustainable-federal-buildings-and-campuses (last visited Mar.
20, 2016). For more on this topic, see Shackelford & Fort, supra note 44.
107. LEED, supra note 106.
108. See UK CABINET OFFICE, THE UK CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY: PROTECTING AND
PROMOTING
THE
UK
IN
A
DIGITAL
WORLD
32
(2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/60961/uk-cybersecurity-strategy-final.pdf.
109. See Adriene Hill, Wet Towels in Hotel Rooms is a Corporate Goal, MARKETPLACE (Sept.
18, 2013), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/sustainability/wet-towels-hotel-rooms-corporate-goal.
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from their business partners, for example."10 Incentives could be offered to have
a similar level of uptake for the NIS Directive and other similar schemes across
Europe and beyond.
B.

Policymakers could expand integrated reporting requirements to
include information on cybersecurity in their sustainability reports
while
encouraging firms particularly critical infrastructure
operators-toconsider cybersecurity to be partof their corporatesocial
responsibility.

Policymakers could incentivize firms to take a wide view of risk
management to encompass all of the dimensions of sustainability economic,
environmental, social, and, potentially, security. To do this, it may be helpful to
leverage the power of integrated reporting to better inform managers and other
stakeholders, including investors, about the impact of their business operations.
Nearly 7,000 organizations have submitted more than 22,000 Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI) reports as of December 2015, making the framework the
dominant sustainability-reporting standard for international business."
Although submitting a report does not compel a given business decision,
protagonists argue that the act of compiling and disclosing the information can
have an impact on firm decision making.11 2 Some thirty-three nations have
either required publicly traded firms to submit sustainability reports or have
encouraged such disclosure.1 3 By April 2014, the European Parliament had
passed an integrated reporting statute affecting companies of more than 500
employees.11 4 Policymakers could either amend existing integrated reporting
statutes or reinterpret them to include a good faith effort for how companies'
operations particularly CI operators-impact EU or U.S. cybersecurity, while
being cognizant that no firm, or government for that matter, has total situational
awareness. Relatedly, policymakers could suggest that cybersecurity should be
treated as a firm's corporate social responsibility given the large number of

110. See FACT SHEET: White House Summit on Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection,
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/fact-sheet-

white-house-summit-cybersecurity-and-consumer-protection.
111. SustainabilityDisclosureDatabase,GRI, http://database.globalreporting.org/ (last visited
Feb. 1, 2016) (stating that 8,706 organizations have submitted 22,382 GRI Reports as of February 1,
2015).
112. Jo Confino, What's the Purpose of Sustainability Reporting?, GUARDIAN (May 23,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/what-is-purpose-of-sustainabilityreporting.
113. ERNST & YOUNG,
VALUE
OF
SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING
11
(2013),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-_Valueofsustainabilityreporting/$FILE/EYValue-of-Sustainability-Reporting.pdf
114. See It's the Law: Big EU CompaniesMust Report on Sustainability, GREENBIZ (Apr. 17,
2014), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/04/17/eu-law-big-companies-report-sustainability.
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businesses that depend on the proper functioning of CI networks, which is
similar to calls by former U.S. cybersecurity coordinator Howard Schmidt." 5
C.

To help safeguardcriticalICT, policymakers could provide incentives to
deepen international information sharing while similarly expanding
cyber attack reportingrequirements.

Within this cybersecurity due diligence theme, public-private, privateprivate, and private-public information sharing could be incentivized with a
particular emphasis on CI firms sharing cyber threat data and best practices with
one another across borders and sectors in a manner consistent with existing EU
privacy laws. This would represent a deepening of the cooperation network
envisioned in the NIS Directive.116 The U.S. took a step in this direction in
December 2015 with the passage of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 that
incentivizes cyber threat information sharing by offering liability protections as
was discussed above," 7 but more remains to be done.
Also in the vein of deepening the pool of information to help guide
policymakers, cyber attack reporting requirements could be expanded and
reinforced. In the U.S., as of June 2014, more than 1,500 companies traded on
the NYSE included information regarding cybersecurity in their Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, which is "up from 1,288 in all of 2013."118
Building on the NIS Directive,11 9 policymakers in other jurisdictions could
require such disclosure on that part of CI entities along with incentivizing the use
of cybersecurity frameworks and the new ISO standards for vulnerability
disclosure. Further, incident "significance" could be amended to include not

115. Howard A. Schmidt, Price of Inaction Will Be Onerous, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/10/17/should-industry-face-more-cybersecuritymandates/price-of-inaction-on-cybersecurity-will-be-the-greatest.
116. See, e.g., EU Reaches Agreement on Cybersecurity Rules, JONES DAY (Dec. 7, 2015),
http://thewritestuff.jonesday.com/rv/ff00244f33c81ad8c93fc552d943a31ce4517b34?utmsource=M
ondaq&utmmedium=syndication&utmcampaign=View-Original
(discussing an agreement
between the European Parliament and the Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the EU "to
strengthen network and information security across the EU.").
117. See supra Part III; Jessica Davis, 5 Key Takeaways from Cybersecurity Act of 2015,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/5-key-takeawayscybersecurity-act-2015 ("The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act protects the liability of private
sector entities when sharing and receiving cyber threat information. It also establishes the personal
data that needs to be removed before data sharing can occur and how quickly individuals must be
notified their information was shared.").
118. See Danny Yadron, Corporate Boards Race to Shore Up Cybersecurity, WALL ST. J.
(June 29, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/boards-race-to-bolster-cybersecurity-1404086146.
119. See European Commission Press Release, supra note 97 (noting that the NIS Directive
"require[s] operators of essential services in the energy, transport, banking and healthcare sectors,
and providers of key digital services like search engines and cloud computing, to take appropriate
security measures and report incidents to the national authorities.").
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only the number of users, duration, and geographic spread of the incident, but
also its type.120

D. Policymakers could encourage a more proactive cybersecurity stance
on the part of CI operators including potentially offering subsidized
cyber risk insurance schemes in exchange for in-depth cybersecurity
audits aspart of an overarchingcyber hygiene campaign.
The proactive cybersecurity movement includes technological best practices
ranging from real-time analytics to cybersecurity audits promoting built-in
resilience. While "hacking back" is often a highly visible point of contention
when discussing the role of private sector active defense, it is a small part of a
growing field.121 Many regulators, for example, continue to focus on the "hack
back" question rather than on identifying, instilling, and spreading cybersecurity
standards of behavior. Policymakers could, for example, encourage the creation
of collective proactive cybersecurity forums. One example of this is Operation
SMN, during which a group of private firms engaged in "the first-ever private
sponsored interdiction against a sophisticated state sponsored advanced threat
group."122

Overall, policymakers could encourage constant vigilance, e.g.,

letting an initial process of cybersecurity due diligence be the first, and not the
last, word in an ongoing proactive and comprehensive cybersecurity policy that
promotes cyber hygiene along with the best practices essential for battling
advanced threats. CI operators in particular could be required to have a widely
disseminated and regularly vetted cybersecurity strategy as part of their
overarching enterprise risk management process, along with having an incident
response plan in place that includes information sharing. The NIS Directive
takes steps to make such ideas a reality for firms operating in Europe.123
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission seems to be taking a step in this
direction as part of its enforcement actions under Section 5(a) dealing with
"unfair" trade practices, which could be copied in other jurisdictions. 124
Related to the proactive cybersecurity movement, some commentators have
been arguing that insurance is a "key part of the [cybersecurity] solution" for

120. See id.
121. For more on the benefits of a more proactive approach to cybersecurity, see Amanda N.
Craig, Scott J. Shackelford & Janine Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A ComparativeIndustry and
RegulatoryAnalysis, 52 AM. Bus. L.J. 721 (2015).
122. NOVETTA, OPERATION SMN: AXIoM THREAT ACTOR GROUP REPORT 4 (2014),
https://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11 /Executive Summary-Final 1.pdf.
123. See European Commission Press Release, supra note 97.
124. Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It Unfairly Placed Consumers' Payment Card
Information At Risk, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-placed-consumers-payment.
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years, but it has only relatively recently begun to catch on.125 Part of the reason
for this delay lays in concerns surrounding the accurate assessment of risk, as
well as geographical limitations. If managers are not forthcoming, or do not
have adequate safeguard in place, then the insurance company may decline
coverage, as happened to British electrical grid operator in early 2014.126 Still,

despite the limitations, success stories abound-like Brookeland Fresh Water
Supply in Texas, from which cybercriminals stole $35,000, but because of its
insurance policy, instead of going out of business, it only lost its $500
deductible.1 27 Policymakers could consider offering subsidized cyber risk
insurance policies in exchange for in-depth cybersecurity audits of applying CI
firms, having the dual benefit of mitigating cyber risk to those firms while
potentially enhancing the overall level of private-sector cybersecurity due
diligence.128

To help boost cybersecurity literacy, policymakers could incentivize
stakeholders to make anti-malware and anti-spyware tools available to their
citizens for free along with certain open source encryption technologies to better
safeguard private data. Lists of other best practices and resources could be
developed building on the UK's "10 steps to cybersecurity" guide.129 It is worth

noting, though, the U.S. seems to be going in the opposite direction, paying lip
service as to the importance of building cybersecurity awareness while cutting
the budget to do so. Sanctions and countermeasures could be used against
nations that launch or sponsor cyber attacks, along with export controls being
placed on certain dual-use cyber weapons technologies including clarifying the
legality of high-grade encryption.1 30 Similarly, legal assistance treaties could be
strengthened and forums created to help prosecute attackers while encouraging
State practice to further build out an international cybersecurity due diligence
norm.

125. Interview with Chris Palmer, Google Engineer and Former Technology Director,
Electronic Frontiers Foundation, in San Francisco, Cal. (Feb. 25, 2011).
126. See Mark Ward, Energy Firm Cyber-Defense is 'Too Weak, Insurers Say, BBC (Feb. 27,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26358042.
127. See The Case for Cybersecurity Insurance, Part II, KREBS ON SEC.,
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/07/the-case-for-cybersecurity-insurance-part-ii/
(last visited Jan.
23, 2014).
128. For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell, Risky Business: Lessons
for Mitigating Cyber Attacks from the InternationalInsuranceLaw on Piracy, 24 MINN. J. INT'L L.
ONLINE 1 (2015).
129. U.K.
CABINET
OFFICE,
TEN
STEPS
TO
CYBER
SECURITY
(2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/10-steps-to-cyber-security-advice-sheets.
130. See International Traffic in Arms Regulations 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2014).
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Policymakers could encourage the development of cybersecurity clinics
for underserved stakeholders and otherwise help build the cybersecurity
capacity such as through norm building measures.

Grants could be offered to universities and research institutions that are
willing to create cybersecurity clinics, helping underserved stakeholdersincluding CI operators, small businesses, schools, and local governments-to
enhance their cybersecurity due diligence once overall capability levels rise.
Moreover, consistent with the draft NIS Directive, policymakers could set up
cybersecurity training and education resources, as well as suggest ways in which
new or revised national cybersecurity strategies could focus more on CI
protection such as through information sharing and private-sector
collaboration.131
Finally, policymakers could encourage polycentric norm
building, such as by States working in small groups to start building trust around
the protection of critical international infrastructure like energy and finance.
More generally, as was referenced in the first cybersecurity due diligence
stream, a cybersecurity due diligence matrix could be developed, a scorecard by
which EU Member Nations' cybersecurity efforts could be readily compared.
An example matrix is included below that simplifies these five themes into three
more general due diligence categories, proposing a non-comprehensive, working
set of domestic "State responsibilities" that contribute to fulfilling a state's
international law obligation on cyber due diligence. Implementation of a given
State's responsibilities varies across state and institutional settings. For instance,
one State may legally mandate certain technological standards whereas another
state may choose a voluntary framework for cybersecurity standards (such as the
NIS Directive or NIST Framework) or leave it to private industry associations to
establish frameworks and standards for particular business sectors. To describe
and measure a particular responsibility, we suggest adopting a maturity model,
similar to that used in software development.

131. For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford & Andraz Kastelic, Toward a StateCentric Cyber Peace?: Analyzing the Role of National Cybersecurity Strategies in Enhancing
Global Cybersecurity, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS & PUB. POL'Y 895 (2015) (forthcoming 2016).
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TABLE 1: STATE'S CYBER DUE DILIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES1

Unite
State's Responsibilities

d
State

Germa
ny

China

S

Establish and Maintain
- Define and implement strategies,

frameworks andpolicies for cybersecurity
(e.g., protection of critical information
infrastructure), and its governance, for the
state and private actors in its jurisdiction
- Introduce or adopt domestic laws and
regulationrelevant to cybersecurity and

cyber crime
- Establish and maintain capabilities to

*133

134

135

*136

137

138

140

141

139

respond and react to cyber incidents (e.g.

132. This research was first published in Shackelford, Russell & Kuehn, supra note 7.
133. See Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, WHITE HOUSE (2008),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/cybersecurity.pdf (summary); NAT'L INST. OF
STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 57.
134. See GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (CIP STRATEGY), 3 (2009), http://www.bmi.bund.de

&

/cae/servlet/contentblob/598732/publicationFile/34423/kritisenglisch.pdf.
135. See Hauke Johannes Gierow, Cyber Security in China: New Political Leadership Focuses
on
Boosting
National
Security,
MERICS
(Dec.
9,
2014),
http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/download/chinamonitor/ChinaMonitorNo.20_eng.pdf.
136. For the U.S., the 2015 Global Cybersecurity Index lists nineteen laws and regulations
related to cybercrime and cybersecurity.
ITU, GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX
CYBERWELLNESS PROFILES 493 (2015), https://www.itu.int/dmspub/itu-d/oph/str/D-STR-secu2015-PDF-E.pdf.
137. For Germany, the 2015 Global CybersecurityIndex lists six laws and regulations related
to cybercrime and cybersecurity. See id. at 206.
138. For China, the 2015 Global CybersecurityIndex lists five laws and regulations related to
cybercrime and cybersecurity. See id. at 134; China's National People's Congress released a first
draft of its Network Security Law on July 6, 2015, see, China Solicits Comments on Draft Network
Security
Law,
COVINGTON
(July
10,
2015),
https://www.cov.com/media/files/corporate/publications/file repository/chinapublishes draftnetwork-security law.pdf.
139. See, e.g., US-CERT, https://www.us-cert.gov (last visited Aug. 18, 2015); ("US-CERT
strives for a safer, stronger Internet for all Americans by responding to major incidents, analyzing
threats, and exchanging critical cybersecurity information with trusted partners all around the
world.").
140. See, e.g., CERT-BUND, https://www.bsi.bund.de/CERT-Bunden (last visited Aug. 18,
2015).
141. See, e.g., About Us, CNCERT, http://www.cert.org.nc/publish/english/index.html (last
visited Aug. 18, 2015).
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Unite
State's Responsibilities

d
State

Germa
ny

China

S

computer security incident response team)
- Define and implement technical
standards, measures, and best practices
(e.g., vulnerability patching) for
cybersecurity
- Define and maintain organizational
processes and mechanisms for

142

143

145

146

147

148

cybersecurity
- Provide training, education, and
certificationfor individuals and

144

149

organizations

142. See, e.g., About the Standards Coordination Office, NIST, http://www.nist.gov (last
visited Aug. 18, 2015); About MITRE, MITRE, http://www.mitre.org (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).
143. Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), defines the IT Baseline Protection ("ITGrundschutz") standards and processes. See IT-Grundschutz, FED. OFFICE FOR INFO. SEC.
https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/ITGrundschutz/itgrundschutz.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).
The 2015 IT Security Act requires government agencies and CI operators to meet minimal IT
security standards. See Petlev Gabel et al., Germany Rolls Out IT Security Act, WHITE & CASE
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/german rolls out itsecurity act.
144. For instance, the Network and Information Security Standardization Technical
Committee of the China Communications Standards Association has issued numerous technical IT
security standards.
See Network & Information Security Technical Committee, CCSA,
http://www.ccsa.org.cn/english/tc.php?tcid=is (last visited Aug. 18, 2015). The ITU Global
Cybersecurity Index counted eighteen standards that were approved by this committee in 2010.
ITU, supra note 136, at 134.
145. See, e.g., About the Standards CoordinationOffice, supra note 140; About MITRE, supra
note 140.
146. See, e.g., IT-Grundschutz, supra note 143. The 2015 IT Security Act requires CI
operators to notify the BSI about significant cyber incidents; in addition, telecom service providers
are required to inform their customers, if they detect malicious traffic from their customers'
networks or computers such as botnets. See Gabel et al., supra note 143.
147. U.S. educational and training efforts include, for instance, the National Cyber Security
Awareness Month, the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICCS), and the
designation of academic institutions as National Centers of Academic Excellence in Information
Assurance (IA)/Cyber Defense (CD) in education and research. See, e.g., STAY SAFE ONLINE,
https://www.staysafeonline.org/ncsam/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).
148. The BSI, for instance, certifies individuals, service providers, systems, services, and
products with regard to IT security and assurance. See Topics, FED. OFFICE FOR INFO. SEC;
https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/Certifcation/certification-nate.html.
Germany has no federal
authority charged with educational or professional training for cybersecurity and related public
awareness that we could uncover. See ITU, supra note 136, at 207.
149. For instance, the July 2015 draft of China's Network Security Law addressed cyber
education and training in articles 15, 16, and 28. See, Cybersecurity Law (Draft), CHINA LAW
TRANSLATE (July 6, 2015), http://chinalawtranslate.com/cybersecuritydraft/?lang=en.
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Unite
State's Responsibilities

d
State

Germa
ny

China

*151

*152

S

- Engage in collaborationon cybersecurity
such as through Budapest Convention (e.g.,
information sharing, law enforcement,
intelligence) with domestic and
international actors
Control and Enforce
- Hold ownership or exercise regulatory

*150

*153

154

155

150. The U.S. ratified the Budapest Convention and emphasized the importance of
international collaboration in its 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace. DHS, for instance, has
international sharing agreements with India and Israel. See Andreas Kuehn & Milton Mueller,
Einstein on the Beach: Surveillance Technology, Cybersecurity and Organizational Change, in
SECURITY IN CYBERSPACE: TARGETING NATIONS, INFRASTRUCTURES, INDIVIDUALS 127, 143
(Giampiero Giacomello ed., 2014). Domestically, the 2015 Executive Order on Promoting Private
Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing encourages information sharing and analysis
organizations. See Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing, WHITE HOUSE
(Feb.
13,
2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-

promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-information-shari.
151. See
Alliance
for
Cyber
Security,
BSI,
https://www.allianzfuercybersicherheit.de/ACS/DE/-/downloads/ACSBroschuereen.htm/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
152. According to the 2015 Global CybersecurityIndex, cooperation and information sharing
is established on the national level within the public sector. In addition, there is "massive
cooperation" among China's telecom operators, the China Internet Network Information Center,
and CNCERT. See ITU, supra note 136, at 135.
153. For instance, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission adopted critical
infrastructure protection standards. See Peter Behr, A Decade After the Northeast Blackout,
Reliability Increases but Human Issues Persist, E&E PUB.
(Aug.
12, 2013),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059985876/print.
While the 2014 NIST Framework does not
establish additional regulatory requirements, utilities and operator of critical infrastructure may find
it hard to avoid implementation. See Stephen M. Spina & J. Daniel Skees, Electric Utilities and the
CybersecurityExecutive Order: Anticipatingthe Next Year, 26 ELECTRICITY J. 61, 61 (2013).
154. The 2015 IT Security Act addressed IT security requirements for CI. See Gabel et al.,
supra note 143.
155. It is generally understood that China's government holds more direct control over CI than
its Western counterparts. In the telecom sector, for instance, the major operators are state-owned; in
addition, there are limitations on foreign investments, and thus foreign ownership and control are
limited. See Yukyung Yeo, Between Owner and Regulator: Governing the Business of China's
Telecommunications
Service
Industry,
200
CHINA
Q.
1013,
1032
(2009),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/SO305741009990609. On July 1, 2015 China adopted a new National
Security Law that reinforced Chinese authorities' control to maintain security in all fields, including
cyber; it mandates national security reviews for foreign investments in Internet technologies and
ICT. See, e.g., Edward Wong, China Approves Sweeping Security Law, Bolstering Communist
Rule, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/world/asia/china-approvessweeping-security-law-bolstering-communist-rule.html; Timothy P. Stratford et al., China's New
NationalSecurity Law, NAT'L L. REV. (July 7, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/china-snew-national-security-law.
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Unite
State's Responsibilities

d
State

Germa
ny

China

S

control over criticalinfrastructure
- Conduct review and control of
information technology deployed in critical
infrastructure
- Enforce compliance with regulations and
policies
Monitor and Assess
- Monitor and assess cyber risks and
threats landscape

157

*156
158

159

161

162

160

156. In 2012, the U.S. House Intelligence Committee warned U.S. telecom operators not to
buy network equipment from Chinese equipment manufacturers ZTE and Huawei. Since 2013,
certain U.S. federal departments and agencies require governmental approval before sourcing
information technology from Chinese companies. See, e.g., Megha Rajagopalan, China "Resolutely
Opposes" U.S. Curbs on IT Imports: State Media, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/30/us-china-us-trade-idUSBRE92T01J20130330
(explaining how NASA and the Justice and Commerce Departments must get approval from
"federal law enforcement officers before buying information technology systems from China.").
157. See, e.g., NATHANIEL AHRENS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND CHINA'S INFORMATION
SECURITY
STANDARDS:
OF
SHOES,
BUTTONS,
AND
ROUTERS
(2012),
http://csis.org/publication/national-security-and-chinas-information-security-standards.
158. The authors are not aware of any systematic study that addresses the compliance and
degree of enforcement with domestic cyber regulations and policies. However, the U.S. has
implemented various legislation and regulation that target cybersecurity and cybercrime. See ITU,
supra note 136, at 493.
159. The authors are not aware of any systematic study that addresses the compliance and
degree of enforcement with domestic cyber regulations and policies. Germany has implemented
various legislation and regulation that target cybersecurity and cybercrime. See Id. at 206.
160. The authors are not aware of any systematic study that addresses the compliance and
degree of enforcement with domestic cyber regulations and policies. China has implemented
various legislation and regulation that target cybersecurity and cybercrime. See Id. at 134.
161. The US-CERT provides threat information through its National Cyber Awareness
System. See National Cyber Awareness System, US-CERT, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas (last
visited Aug. 18, 2015). The U.S. intelligence community addresses cyber threats in its annual
Worldwide Threat Assessment.
See, e.g., JAMES R. CLAPPER, SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, 2 (Feb.

26,
2015),
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATASFR
-_SASCFINAL.pdf.
162. The BSI issues an annual report on the state of cybersecurity that addresses cyber risks
and threats. See, e.g., DIE LAGE DER IT-SICHERHEIT IN DEUTSCHLAND 2014, BSI (Dec.15,
2014),
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/Lageberichte/
Lagebericht2014.html. The 2015 IT Security Act requires CI operators to provide regular proof of
compliance regarding IT security requirements in form of audits, evaluation, or certification. See
Gabel et al., supra note 143.
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In addition to the elements from Table 1, low-hanging fruit should also not
be ignored given that some of the reforms suggested in this Part are politically
difficult to implement. The Australian government, for example, has reportedly
been succcessful in preventing 85% of cyber attacks through following three
common sense techniques: application whitelisting (only permitting preapproved programs to operate on networks), regularly patching applications and
operating systems, and "minimizing the number of people on a network who
have 'administrator' privileges.' 63 This stuff isn't rocket science, after all; it's
just computer science.
VI. CONCLUSION

In short, an all-of-the-above approach is needed to build out the arena of
cybersecurity due diligence. Working together through polycentric partnerships
at the national, bilateral, and regional levels, we can mitigate cyber risk by laying
the groundwork for a positive cyber peace that includes a robust cybersecurity
due diligence norm. How this topic will be operationalized is ultimately in the
hands of policymakers, but through some combination of the cybersecurity due
diligence themes discussed in Part IV including tailored frameworks,
integrated reporting, information sharing, instilling active defense, cyber risk
mitigation best practices, and cybersecurity capacity building-significant
progress is possible. Indeed, with the recent passage of the NIS Directive and
the GDPR, as well as developments in the U.S. such as the success of the NIST
Framework, enactment of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, and the FTC
enforcement actions, the time is ripe for deeper engagement to help leverage the
power of the market to operationalize cybersecurity due diligence.

163. James A. Lewis, Raising the Bar for Cybersecurity, CSIS, 1, 7-8 (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://csis.org/files/publication/130212_LewisRaisingBarCybersecurity.pdf.
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